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1. Introduction 
In 1980, the author of this presentation participated in 
conducting a baseline survey of the health status of the 
inhabitants of Zbeidat, a peasant refugee community of 
seminomadic origins that resettled in the Jordan Valley followinQ 
the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. At the time of the survey, Zbeidat 
was about to emerge into the modern world. After years of being 
neglected by governmental authorities and development agencies, 
drip irrigation technology was introduced in farming with the 
financial and technical assistance of the Mennonite Central 
committee (MCC) in 1977 (1). The resulting increased productivity 
opened up a new era in the history of this community, both in 
terms of the ability to accumulate wealth and its new linkages 
with the outside world. 
This presentation will examine the kind of path which community 
development in health took in Zbeidat. We shall also look at how 
MCC and the other voluntary agencies proceeded to introduce 
community development projects into this community. Finally, an 
attempt will be made to identify the various factors that 
contributed to the failure of an experiment, and the creation of 
new problems. 
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2. The Community in 1980 
with a total population of about 400, Zbeidat of the 1970s 
presented the classical indices of underdevelopment: infant 
mortality was about 10%, malnutrition over 50% among children 
under five, and literacy very low with two and a half times as 
many illiterate females as males. Life in general was not 
exactly pleasant. More like a garbage dump, both inside and 
outside the mud brick houses and shacks, than an inhabited area, 
Zbeidat lacked the most basic services, such as a potable water 
supply, electricity, adequate living space, latrines, health 
facilities and schools, to name only a few (2). About three 
fourths of the households owned the land they cultivated. 
However, a substantial number of farmers had sharecropping 
arrangements with absentee and resident landlords as an 
additional source of income. The structure of relations between 
the Zbeidat farmers on the one hand and landlords and commission 
agents on the other hand was exploitative, always leaving the 
farmer dependent on both for advance credit, supplies, and the 
marketing of produce. 
The pioneering step that MCC took in extending its agricultural 
development services to Zbeidat resurrected this community, which 
was disintegrating due to land confiscation, demographic 
pressures, low productivity, rising costs of agricultural 
expenditures and other factors. Drip irrigation technology 
increased crop yields, allowed the farmer to accumulate surplus, 
and freed him to some extent from his dependence on commission 
agents. But it also increased the integration of the Zbeidat 
farmer into the Jordanian, Israeli and international marketing 
networks, thus introducing a new type of dependence into the 
community (3). 
MCC's involvement in the Jordan Valley region revived the 
interest of other development agencies, researchers and media in 
the area, which strengthened the connections of Zbeidat with the 
outside world. Guidelines for intervention programmes in health, 
laid down in the survey report that was prepared in 1980 (4) at 
the request of MCC, stressed two major points: the first, while 
acknowledging the impact of improved income levels on health, 
emphasised the need for further action geared towards people's 
needs, environmental control and health education. The second 
alerted the agencies to the importance of community 
participation, and the need for consciousness-raising as an 
integral component of development activities in this community. 
When the survey, and thus the involvement of the researchers in 
Zbeidat ended in 1980, two central questions remained unanswered. 
The first related to the ability of the Zbeidat farmers to meet 
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the challenge of changed circumstances. Specifically, it 
concerned their ability to perceive the necessity of investing 
the surplus in collective infrastructural projects, as opposed to 
individual ones such as the construction of houses. It also 
referred to their ability to organise, perhaps in a cooperative 
form, so as to reduce the control the landlords and commission 
agents exercised over them. The second question related to the 
role that development agencies could playas organisers in 
improving this community's situation. Whether agencies would be 
able to plan and implement programmes in accordance with 
people's needs, whether they would successfully incorporate the 
community into the decision-making and allow them the chance to 
participate in the implementation and operation of projects, and 
whether agencies would be able to contribute to consciousness­
raising and community mobilisation remained to be seen. 
3. Planning and Implementation of the Health Project 
In view of the isolation of the village, the scarcity of 
resources, and the absence of governmental programmes for health 
care promotion, it was suggested to the organisers that perhaps 
the only feasible step to take was to train individuals from the 
village in basic health care. This training was to include first 
aid procedures, sanitation control, health and nutrition 
education and the training of traditional midwives. Training was 
to incorporate traditional practices with modern methods. A 
married woman respected by the community seemed to be a likely 
choice for a trainee in basic health care, since it was women who 
were mostly responsible for family health in this community. The 
organisers, however, were unable to locate an institution in the 
West Bank that would take the responsibility of training at a 
non-degree level (5). This, in effect, eliminated the possibility 
of training a woman, for the requirement to enroll in the two­
year university course in village health work that only Bethlehem 
University offered included a Tawjihi certificate (6). Thus 
Amin, a man, was chosen by the extended family head (mukhtar) of 
Zbeidat, for he was one of the very few males who possessed this 
certificate and was willing to train. The community promised to 
arrange for the payment of Amin's salary, once he had completed 
his training and assumed his duties. within a few months, 
however, Amin failed his course, and the organisers were faced 
with the problem of what to do with him. It was finally arranged 
that both Amin and his wife 'Alia would train under the 
supervision of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (7), who, in turn, 
would make contacts with various health institutions and admit 
Amin to train by practice. 'Alia was to take a course in mother 
and child health care that was being offered by CRS. Her 
inclusion as a trainee was apparently thought to solve the 
problem of Amin being inaccessible to females in Zbeidat. 
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I 4. Zbeidat Revisited in 1985: Problems and Explanations !l .. 
. ".~ 
I, 
For three years, MCC, in cooperation with CRS, planned and 
implemented projects for Zbeidat. New one- and two-storey houses 
were constructed, electricity was installed, intra-village roads 
were opened, a kindergarten was set up, and village health 
workers were being trained. Additionally, plans were under way 
to form a charitable society that was to take the responsibility 
of administering some of the projects, to install a potable water 
supply in households, and to build a community centre that was to 
house the clinic, a school, an adult literacy programme, the 
kindergarten and a village meeting centre (8). By the summer of 
1983, Amin and 'Alia had completed their training and returned to 
the village to set up the health programme. But they faced 
resistance. This prompted the new directors of MCC and CRS (9) 
to request the author to visit Zbeidat again, this time in order 
to arrive at an understanding of the problem. 
In summary, it appeared that the work and knowledge of Amin and 
'Alia were being rejected by the community. Very quickly, they 
became the laughing-stock of the village. within weeks after 
their return, Amin's father was threatening to throw them out of 
the house, claiming they had become a liability in both financial 
and moral terms. Amin's crisis reached its peak when finally, 
because he displayed some books in the unused clinic that were 
deemed political and therefore dangerous, the village leaders 
decided to banish him from the village. 
4.1 The Training of the Local Health Worker 
Several features of the problem deserve discussion. The first is 
the nature of Amin's training. His apprenticeship in health 
basically prepared him to assume two roles: one as a physician's 
aid in a curative clinic, and another as an environmental and 
sanitation control worker improving the sanitary conditions by 
way of project design and implementation and through community 
education. Once Amin returned to Zbeidat, it transpired that the 
first task was impossible to carry out: there was no curative 
clinic or physician in the village. Due to the constraints 
imposed by the isolation of the village and the general political 
situation in the area, the chances were that, at best, the 
community and the voluntary agencies might have been able to 
arrange for a physician to visit Zbeidat once or twice a week. 
Discouraged, Amin turned to practically the only technique that 
was possible to apply in such circumstances. To justify his 
newly acquired status, he became "injection-happy" and began 
administering injections indiscriminatelY, to anyone who asked, 
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without supervision, and sometimes without prescription by a 
physician. But injecting patients soon became insufficient 
evidence of his skills, and the villagers began to question 
Amin's knowledge in health care, and demanded equipment and 
instruments for the clinic from the organisers. Finally, the 
confusion of the organisers as to ~hat these instruments were was 
dissipated in a heated discussion with the villagers: it turned 
out that the perception of the community of health care differed 
sUbstantially from that of the organisers. To the villagers, 
first aid, rehydration, health education and sanitation control 
were alien concepts, which had never been discussed with them, 
and did not seem to matter at all. To the villagers, the idea of 
health care implied very concrete proportions: a clinic, with a 
couch, a blood pressure set and stethoscope, a physician, 
injections and drugs. So, their question was: "What did you 
train Amin as; if he is not a doctor, what is he?" 
What made matters worse for Amin was that his training in 
environmental control and sanitation did not take into account 
the environmental conditions in the area, the financial situation 
of the community, village life in general and, least of all, the 
state of consciousness of the people regarding sanitation and 
health. Thus Amin, with his inappropriate training, proceeded to 
implement the sanitation programme by trying to convince the 
community to place their refuse in especially purchased garbage 
bags, which were later to be transported to an area outside the 
village. But the entire village looked like a dump, and no one 
thought it was unusual! When this idea was not met with too much 
enthusiasm, he tried another suggestion that he had brought from 
the city, this time going through the laborious task of visiting 
every single household to explain the need for installing window 
screens to ward off the evil of mosquitoes and other dangerous 
insects. This was to take place in houses that were full of 
holes of all sizes and shapes! Perhaps these ideas contributed to 
Arnin turning from a potentially respected personality into 
the laughing-stock of his community. 
In short, the problem connected with Amin's training was embedded 
in the improper conceptualisation of the kind of role he was to 
play in his community. It also lay in the basic incompatibility 
between his newly acquired knowledge in health care and people's 
needs and perception of health. The problem then was not exactly 
due to the "backwardness" of the community, as Amin had expressed 
it. By dismissing Amin's suggestions and by going back on their 
promise to support his salary, the villagers, among other factors 
that will be discussed later, made rational attempts to bal~nce 
gains versus losses. And they opted out of the village health 
care programme, because it offered too little for them. 
since his return from the city, Amin had also refused to work on 
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the land. When we inquired as to why he would not, for instance, 
consider working with his family in farming while he awaited the 
resolution of his salary problem, he expressed great surprise and 
'2>e.'Je:re. cl1.'2>t:o.'2>t.e. fl::)"!: l::)\l"!: '2>\l~~e.C2,'\.il::)l\. \\e. e.i\.C\lse.li '\\.\..~s~\.t ~'i 
stating that he could not work in agriculture, for he now 
developed blisters on his fingers and backache when he did. 
Though the real reasons for this distaste of agricultural labour 
may never be revealed, it is our strong suspicion that training 
in the city had had its impact on Amin's self-perception. It 
appeared as if, having been "trained" and being "almost a 
doctor", it was now inconceivable for him to earn his living like 
the other members of his community. Whatever the reasons for 
this attitude might have been, it effectively alienated him 
further from his community. 
4.2 The Community Attitude Towards the Local Health Worker 
The second feature of the problem deals with the choice of 'Alia. 
To begin with, the rationale for training two village health 
workers remains a mystery to us (one would have been perfectly 
sufficient) . In addition, it seems rather obvious that a 
community of 400 people, with limited resources and mounting 
needs and aspirations, would almost certainly not be able or 
willing to support the salaries of two workers. As it turned 
out, there was not even the willingness to support one, for the 
benefits were not obvious, and the perceived needs of people lay 
elsewhere. Apart from this, 'Alia herself posed a problem. She 
was chosen for training neither by the villagers nor by the 
mukhtar. She was trained simply because she happened to be 
Amln's -wife, and was thus allowed by her community to leave the 
village and train in the city, under her husband's supervision. 
On the surface, this appears to be a good reason for such a 
choice, and a quick solution to a complicated problem. However, 
had the organisers discussed the question of 'Alia with the 
villagers, they would probably have opted out of this choice, 
thereby saving the money spent on her training and sparing her 
frustration and despair. A major factor in 'Alia's life history 
was the fact that she was a newcomer to the community. 
originally from the faction of the Zbeidat tribe that had to 
resettle in Jordan as a result of the 1948 war, 'Alia lived most 
of her life in the city, in Amman. She married Amin, her cousin, 
and came to Zbeidat to face a difficult and "back.ward" life. It 
became obvious when we talked to her that she was not very happy 
about being there, and that she basically regarded this community 
with contempt. Discussions with other women in the village 
conf irmed that they regarded her as an outsider. r10re 
importantly, to them she was disrespectful of the community, and l 
therefore, not worthy of trust. 
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Thus, when 'Alia carne back from her training course, she was 
faced with a double problem as she tried to set up a mother and 
child health service. One was the general difficulty of putting 
such a non-concrete and untested programme into action, in 
isolation from other more tangible and appreciated aspects of 
health care. The women of Zbeidat failed to see the rationale 
behind weighing children and receiving health and nutrition 
education, which was the core of 'Alia's programme. To them, it 
did not make sense to take the trouble and the time to attend the 
programme because, as some stated, they had always raised their 
children without such services, never perceiving a need for them, 
or the problems that may ensue as a result of their absence. Had 
this very important programme (but obviously not so important to 
the women of Zbeidat) been set up around or in conjunction with 
other services, such as immunisation of children, the response 
would probably have been different. At that stage in the health 
consciousness of women, immunisation offered them concret£ 
rewards, as it - had already been tested and proven to protect 
against diseases. 
The other problem that 'Alia faced was the lack of trust between 
her and her community. One woman summed up the relation by 
stating that the women of Zbeidat did not need an outsider and 
even less, a young girl without experience in life, to corne and 
tell them how to raise and feed their children, when they 
possessed far more knowledge and experience in that respect. 
Given this state of affairs, it cannot be imagined how it was 
expected that the women of Zbeidat would join this programme, let 
alone pay for its services. 
with the failure of 'Alia's programme, both she and Amin began 
investigating the possibility of salvaging the situation. By 
drawing on the example of how the organisers set up mother and 
child health care centres in other villages, they decided to 
introduce food aid distribution and tie it to the mother and 
child health care service in Zbeidat (10). Food aid would solve 
the problem, they said, because women would then have an 
incentive to attend. This attempt at overcoming the village 
boycott of the programme, however, added insult to injury. Food 
aid included the distribution of powdered milk to mothers and 
children. In a community that lacked a potable water supply, 
suffered from a high incidence of diarrhoeal and gastrointestinal 
diseases, and where breast-feeding was still almost the sole 
method used by mothers to feed their infants, thj.s solution 
seemed like a disaster. 
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4.3 The Funding Agenc~s Pr0C:_E:!_c:!ur~ 
The third aspect of the problem requires the examination of how 
the organisers proceeded to introduce the health project and the 
numerous other development schemes into the village. To begin 
with, a quick review of events that took place during 1980-1983 
alerts us to the fact that too many projects were implemented too 
fast, with too short intervals between them, and sometimes at the 
same time. Most, if not all, required, in accordance with the 
organisers' policy of "self-reliance", some contributions from 
villagers. This factor adds to our understanding of why the 
community refused to pay Amin's salary. Once again, their 
decision was rational, for, as the villagers actually explained, 
no one was willing to contribute to the health project. It was 
not their priority, and even if it had been, their resources were 
exhausted by other projects. 
By pursuing this point further, we found out to our dismay that 
these projects were actually being implemented in accordance with 
the recommendations that had been included at the end of the 
infamous 1980 survey report: they were followed by the book. 
Yet very little regard was paid to the few basic, but extremely 
important principles of how to implement development schemes 
participation of the community in all the stages ranging from the 
decision-making process, the agreement on priorities, to the 
actual operation of projects, the promotion of community spirit 
and consciousness-raising by dialogue and discussion. 
The question is: why did the organisers follow this path of 
decision-making and planning from the top? Various factors 
account for this state of affairs, some of which will be 
discussed shortly. But a few remarks are required here. As far 
as the health project was concerned, discussion, dialogue, 
participation and other cooperative activities were virtually 
impossible. The organisers were not only foreigners, but they 
seemed to live on the fringes of this society, know little about 
it in general, and its tradition and culture in particular. 
Thus, they could not have had the necessary insights needed for 
the implementation of a health programme which was not. wi thin the 
range of daily experience i.n the village. Most importantly, they 
could not even speak the language. Thus, their genuine efforts 
at basic communication with the villagers, let alone 
understanding the sometimes intri.cate points and undercurrents 
that emanate from a discussion, resulted in failure and 
frustration (11). 
But apparently they had no Choice, for it had already been 
decided by the policy-makers of the agencies to embark on 
community development activities, the fashionable thing to do, 
~nd there was no allowance made for the hiring of a Palestinian 
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for the purpose. 
This was not the case with the other development projects, where 
the planner and executor was a dynamic, very hard-working and 
dedicated Palestinian. Their problem there was that, in spite of 
the very crude form in which the concept of self-reliance was 
applied (partial support of project costs by villagers, for 
instance), every other message the community was given reinforced 
dependence on the agencies and the patron-client nature of the 
relationship between them. In fact, a new type of consciousness 
was emerging in Zbeidat as a result of this sudden intensive 
contact with the outside world. The villagers discovered the 
ease with which they could obtain grants and subsidies from 
voluntary agencies and the Jordanian-PLO Joint Committee (12). 
During the first few encounters we had with the people of Zbeidat 
in the summer of 1983, it became apparent that, in spite of the 
heated discussions regarding Amin and the woes of the health 
project, what really mattered to the villagers was not the 
discussions, nor the solution to the problem, but their interest 
in "landing" yet another grant, for the community centre, for the 
new water tank and so on. They became confused when the new 
director of MCC (who was the first to perceive and courageously 
face the problem) sUddenly changed a policy which had operated 
for several years, and flatly refused to extend any further 
grants or loans to them. Despairing of MeC, they proceeded to 
ask us for the addresses of other voluntary agencies in 
Jerusalem! 
In general, there was no strategy nor a coherent collective plan 
for the development of Zbeidat. There was a great deal of 
activity, and a very crude form of "self-reliance" ideology. The 
ideological force behind the developments in Zbeidat can be 
summarised in what is locally called "steadfastness". This 
concept has evolved as a basic slogan for the national struggle, 
and aims at the prevention of land confiscation by various 
methods, including the encouragement of peasants to work the land 
(land reclamation, for instance), stabilisation of communities by 
increasing productivity (drip technology), and the provision of 
basic services that the military government should, but does not 
provide. In view of this ideological background and the quite 
understandable human response of the organisers to the unlivable 
conditions that prevailed in Zbeidat, the course of the 
development of Zbeidat was sealed, money poured in, services were 
set up and the existing and problematic system of patronage was 
cemented. This, of course, contradicted and effectively 
eliminated whatever spirit of self-reliance existed in this 
community. It also eJiminated the possibility of w0rking with 
the community on participation, genuine self-reliance and 
consciousness-raising in health. 
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Even if the ideology was not a problem, it would have been 
difficult indeed for the organisers to pursue a different course. 
The reasons are, in part, related to the peculiar political 
situation of the occupied Territories (to be discussed later), 
and to the framework within which the organisers of community 
development in Zbeidat as well as most other development agencies 
operate. Most agencies appear to be interested in community 
development. Being the fashionable thing to do, the reason for 
the eagerness of most to "jump on the bandwagon" is under­
standable. But more often than not, agencies actually only 
deliver services. Between their drive to reach larger and 
larger numbers of communities (13) and their tendency to quickly 
expend their bUdgets, perhaps to justify their existence or even 
their plans for expansion, they seem to get lost in the jargon of 
community development and miss the substance. Meanwhile, the 
ask becomes an impossiblility, because its substance lies in the 
laborious and difficult functions of discussion and dialogue, of 
investigation and reflection, and of acquiring insights into 
communities. This could not have been done by the organisers in 
Zbeidat because of simple personal problems. At the time, they 
were, and still are, extremely bUSy and heavily involved in 
introducing new technology and a variety of basic services in a 
network that extends across the \vest Bank and sometimes even the 
Gaza strip. 
the question arises: who then is responsible for 
consciousness-raising and community organisation? Given the 
potentially harmful effects of pouring development aid funds into 
communities, without considering the above mentioned factors, 
should voluntary agencies perhaps reconsider their community 
development policies? 
In Zbeidat, the result of this kind of policy is that projects 
other than the health programme are also being met with 
resistance. The kindergarten, for instance, is not being 
attended by children; because mothers do not see the need. This 
the case in spite of the teacher being a respected member of 
the community, and despite her efforts at convincing mothers of 
this project's importance. The obstacle is being overcome, once 
again, by the introduction of a food aid and powdered milk 
distribution programme that is to be supported by the military 
government's social welfare department. 
!,~o~).ems of Commun.i!:y spir~t 
The fourth feature of the problem is one of leadership and 
communi ty spirit. Both have been deeply a f f e c't e d by the '7\bedH 
connection". Up to 1980, the decision-making process in this 
homogeneous community, though controlled to some extent by the 
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leaders, was essentially consensus-based (14). The mukhtar 
elected by community members excercised, according to villagers' 
accounts, his power, based on justice and a genuine interest in 
community welfare. His death in 1982, however, precipitated a 
crisis of leadership. 
'Abed, the second son of the mUkhtar, and, as some villagers 
described him, an "illiterate and a drunkard", was apparently a 
person of questionable character who had ba.rely completed four 
years of schooling. During his teens, he had worked in the 
nearby settlement of Argaman as a wage labourer. This apparently 
led him to establish connections with the Israeli secret service. 
Ever since then, 'Abed was considered "corrupted". Through this 
connection, however, 'Abed became a power figure, for he was able 
to solve some of the problems of Zbeidat with the help of the 
military government, and to deliver important and usually 
unobtainable services to his community (15). Because of this 
connection he became feared, and was thus able to dictate what 
was to be done, particularly after his father died. He was also 
able to form a coalition with two of the larger landlords and 
effectively imposed himself as the new ~ukhtar. So, when the 
military governor came to visit and inquire about the identity of 
the new mUkhtar, the village council was too afraid to express 
its strong objections to this fait accompli. 
Ever since, community meetings have been abolished, and decision­
making in village affairs has fallen into the hands of 'Abed and 
the very few who supported him for personal interests. The 
village was thus split into two factions, those who were for and 
those who were against the mukhtar. To make matters worse, 'Abed 
ruled with great injustice, placing a priority on individual 
interests over communal ones. In the end, he controlled the 
whole village. 
Another factor that may have contributed to the weakening of the 
communal spirit seems to be related to the new phenomenon of 
surplus accumulation. Though this matter should be systematically 
and thoroughly studied because of its importance, it appears as 
if drip irrigation has widened the income gap among families, 
with the landless benefiting the least and those who owned larger 
plots of land the most (16). This seems to have created a 
conflict between collective and individual interests. Consider, 
for instance, the events that occurred during the house-building 
period. By 1981, upon the acquisition of building permits, tllose 
~ho hed larger plots of land t~ilt ne~ ~~uses i~~ediat~:y. 
~anjless families, ho~ever, couid net afford house-builliing 
projects even with loans. When they approached the organisers 
with their problem, a list of names of those in greatest need of 
financial help was drawn up by the organisers and the village 
teacher (who owns one dunum of land only). When the others 
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discovered the list, they were incensed, and, according to the 
teacher, all of a sudden, everyone claimed to be poor. A 
conflict ensued. Unfortunately, it was resolved by the 
organisers deciding to extend building material equivalent to the 
amount of 250 Jordanian Dinars (amounting to about 5% of the 
costs for building an average house) to most families, without 
regard to wealth status. Later, when the organisers discussed 
the issue of building a room in the village to serve as a 
clinic, virtually no one was willing to financially contribute to 
the project. As a result, the organisers themselves paid for the 
clinic's construction. 
Thus, when the time came for the farmers to decide about how to 
invest their surplus, they opted for individual investments of 
the traditional type. Today, the community can be mobilised into 
project action virtually only when projects are subsidised by 
agencies or from Jordan. And the health project has no place 
whatsoever within this kind of consciousness. 
4.5 community Development Under Milita~~occupation 
The last feature of the problem, and perhaps the most entangled 
and the least clear one, is the relationship between community 
development and organisation on the one hand, and the constraints 
imposed by the political reality on the other. Under military 
occupation, there is no coherent and integrated development plan 
for the area, and a lack of interest, at best, on the part of the 
authorities in delivering basic services. These facts, of 
course, have many consequences, but in Zbeidat they meant that 
the attempt at community development took place in a vacuum. 
Take, for instance, Amin and 'Alia's problem. Had there been a 
regional plan for health services in the area, providing for an 
immunisation programme and proper supervision of other services, 
it would probably have been possible for them to earn their 
income serving their village, without being potentially harmful. 
They might also have been able to serve commtlnities living nearby 
(such as Marj Na'jeh). 
Zbeidat is too small and too isolated to be able to support all 
the services needed to render it inhabitable. And it is 
crippled by its inability to surpass its boundaries and seek 
solutions in solidarity with other communities. A regional plan 
delineated by an interested authority might have solved the 
problem. To illustrate the problem further, we can draw on the 
examples of electricity and water. To install electricity, the 
community had to face a difficult choice. It could have been 
connected to the Israeli electrical grid by way of Argaman, the 
settlement that was erected on the confiscated land of Zbeidat. 
But this option would have eliminated the possibility of 
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obtaining a grant from the Jordan-PLC' Joint ::ommittee, for its 
policy prohibits connection with the Israeli grid. This choice 
would also have placed the village at the whim and mercy of the 
settlers, and rendered them more dependent on the Israeli 
government. From both a pragmatic and a national political point 
of view, this choice was rejected. Yet when they received the 
large sum of 15,000 Jordanian Dinars (approximately us $50,000) 
from the Joint Committee, and provided the village with 
electricity by way of a private village generator, they 
discovered that the costs of having electricity only in the 
evenings was about three times higher than the costs of twenty­
four-hour service supplied by the Israeli grid. Then they had to 
face a similar and difficult choice in relatiOn to the water 
project. Jordan promised the even larger sum of 35,000 Jordanian 
Dinars for the installation of a potable water supply system. 
But the villagers are afraid of the increased operating costs, 
knowing that they have the possibility to connect to the Israeli 
water system, again by way of Argaman. 
Zbeidat may be able to continue to pursue its policy of refusal 
to depend on Israel: the connections it has established with 
agencies who, in turn, put a great deal of effort and money into 
sUbsidising services may make this possible. But is this a 
reasonable and realistic choice for the rest of the Occupied 
Territories? And what about the future when we may face the 
problem of very costly village-level services? Would not this 
kind of development overburden the national budget? 
4.6 Lack of Regional Development Plans 
The nagging question is why can Palestinians not take the 
responsibility of formulating and implementing a development plan 
f-:~ '!:::~:'€'mE€lvE'E". C:!E c ; t.':':e 1!'~Ey'E:'S liE's 2:- ":.:":E· ~":!:t~~-·€ cf :.'-:1." 
f ac t Lonal Laed Pales t i nia n na t i oria I :tl'J'iement i.n r:.lle OCCUD .i ed 
Territories. A detailed discussion of the origin and natur~ of 
this problem is beyond t.he scope of this presentation. But we 
may examine its consequences by looking at examples not 
immediately related to Zbeidat. 'The Palest.inian women's 
committees' movement, for instance, is today at the forefront of 
the struggle for community development (17), Yet in spite of 
practically identical platforms and statements of purpose as 
far as women and development objectives are concerned, they 
remain incapable of cooperating with each other, or unifying 
their work and thus becoming a structure that may implement a 
regional plan for development, and perhaps a national one. So 
far, the women's committees are not even capable of dividing 
regions among themselves so that they can avoid clashing in a 
locality that is deemed interesting to work in by more than one 
comm i tt~e. In addition there is the problem of the apparent; 
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ntradiction between national political and development aims. 
ow do we reconcile, for instance, centralised decision-making, 
uthority, and command that are thought to be needed for an 
~fective national political movement, with a self-reliant 
onsciousness-raising perspective whose core lies in the task of 
.'(
elping people to make decisions for themselves? 
from the political framework, very little remains that 
.ould effectively carry out the difficult tasks of planning for 
nd implementing community development projects. Palestinians, 
ntil now, still possess their institutions. But in general, 
hese are incapable of meeting the challenge. Institutions tend 
be centralised (unlike the women's committees which represent 
he first genuine grassroots movement in the Occupied 
erritories) and are primarily located in towns. They generally 
epresent the interests of the middle classes and intelligentsia, 
'ending to be far removed from development needs at the rural 
level (where 70% of the population live), and are plagued by 
hierarchical structures and networks of command. Most 
importantly, they lack the necessary infrastructural network and 
~anpower that can extend across the area. And the possiblility 
that these institutions would cooperate on such schemes still 
seems rather dim, since they, too, suffer from the problem of 
petty rivalries. Foreign agencies are thus left to face the 
problems of community development alone. Lacking guidance from 
Palestinians, they tend to execute projects in accordance with 
their own needs, and in a haphazard fashion. And, given that 
.they cannot even institute projects without prior approval of the 
military government that controls their work, the situation is 
distorted further since, almost always, approvals made by the 
military government are subj ected to pol i t.ical considerations. 
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5. Lessons and Questions 
Many lessons can be learned from the experiment in Zbeidat. Most 
have been repeatedly reiterated elsewhere (18): the difficulty of 
putting a development plan into action, the necessity for 
designing and implementing programmes in accordance with people's 
needs and at a pace that is compatible with their ability to 
respond, the necessity for organisation and consciousness­
raising, and the importance of leadership and community spirit. 
But for us and Zbeidat, the lesson is that if researchers and 
agencies do not possess the time, and the operational structure 
or manpower that could realistically carry out and follow up 
their recommendations and programmes, then perhaps they should 
not become involved at all in community development schemes. The 
lesson also is that an emphasis on increased productivity and 
delivery of services to the exclusion of other requirements for 
development remains an inadequate attempt at radical change. 
There is no doubt that the material gains accrued to the farmers 
of Zbeidat as a result of drip technology have actually improved 
the physical conditions in the village. But drip irrigation has 
not freed the farmers from the control of the commission agents, 
landlords, the military government, and most importantly, their 
own low level of consciousness. 
Today, in Zbeidat, even the material benefits of drip technology 
are jeopardised. On January 5, 1983, a new military order 
(number 1039) was promulgated by the military government 
forbidding the planting of vegetables, specifically tomatoes and 
in the Jordan Valley region unless prior permission 
(19). In Zbeidat, where eggplants and tomatoes 
the very few crops that are capable of withstanding the 
tntty of the soil and have therefore become major crops since 
of drip, the consequences of this order may 
catastrophic. In the summer of 1983, the military 
decided that permits for the planting of tomatoes and 
in the Valley would be restricted to 9,000 instead of 
12,000 dunums that are reserved for these crops. The 
already been instructed to plant 80% of the previous 
allotment for these vegetables, and have expressed 
apprehension about the future. 
But this is not the only limitation of drip technology. The 
people of Zbeidat have yet to face other consequences of the new 
technology: increased land salinity, the impact of the 
utilisation of heavy doses of fertilisers and other chemjcal 
substances on the environment, water purity and people's health, 
to name a few of the problems that we are conscious of. Also, it 
has recently become apparent that, as a result of the double­
cropping system and intensive irrigation that accompanies the 
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technology, Zbeidat land is suffering from increased soil disease 
and an overgrowth of harmful weeds. This, in turn, has decreased 
land productivity. To solve the problem, a new system of 
treating the land with a fumigant, methyl bromide is being 
tested. But methyl bromide is a deadly poison. How the largely 
illiterate people of Zbeidat will be able to adjust to the 
introduction and the presence of such a dangerous chemical in 
their environment, and how this will affect people's health, 
remains to be seen. One thing is clear, however: the farmers of 
Zbeidat are locked into a "circle of poison". 
At this stage in our understanding of community development, we 
do not have answers. We are just beginning to understand the 
difficult questions: what is consciousness-raising in the 
Palestinian context? What are the elements of a development 
. ideology that we need to formulate in a way that this ideology 
would acquire meaning for people? Is there really an inherent 
contradiction between national political and developmental aims, 
and if so, how do we reconcile the two? If not, how then do we 
go about refining and adding new dimensions to the concept of 
steadfastness? How can we bypass the "corruptive" force of the 
indiscriminate flow of development money from both Jordan and 
voluntary agencies? But most importantly, is community 
development possible without a radical change in our political, 
economic and social contexts, and will Palestinians be able to 
surpass their constraints and meet the challenge? 
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Notes And References 
(1)	 A development agency operating in the West Bank with offices 
in Jerusalem. 
(2)	 For further information, see: Tamari, S. and Giacaman, R., 
The Social Impact of the Introduction of Drip Irrigation 
Technigues in a Palestinian Peasant Community in the Jordan 
Valley, Birzeit University, Bir zeit, 1980, Part II. 
(3)	 For further information see ibid., Part I. 
(4)	 The purpose of the survey report was to accumulate baseline 
data for future follow-up and evaluation, to assess the 
impact of drip technology on the community, and to formulate 
recommendations for further action. 
(5)	 At the time, Birzeit University and Birzeit Women's 
Charitable society were already in the process of training 
village health workers in their area. Why they were not 
approached by the organisers remains a mystery. But even if 
they had been, it would have been unlikely that they would 
have undertaken such a responsibility since their programme 
was just being launched and they were finding difficulty 
locating the manpower necessary to train their own students. 
(6)	 The governmental general certificate of high school 
education. 
(7)	 Another development agency working mostly in health, and 
with offices in Jerusalem. 
(8)	 Incidental meetings with MCC personnel kept us marginally in 
touch with the events. 
(9)	 By then, the persons responsible for planning and 
implementing the health programme at both agencies had left 
the country. This left the new MCC director and myself with 
the task of reconstructing the incidents through interviews 
with the village teacher, Amin and 'Alia, and through 
discussions and meetings with the village leaders including 
'Abed, and reviewing the MCC project file. 
(10)	 The organisers here, CRS, are until today heavily involved 
in distributing food aid across the Occupied Territories. 
Birzeit University's Community Health Unit has for several 
years tried in vain to suggest to CRS to reconsider its 
policy. The Unit has accumulated evidence that food aid 
reinforces the very dependence that it regards as 
18 
contradictory to a self-reliant strategy in the provision of 
health care. The unit's experience has been that women, in 
general, attend services to pick up the food, sometimes sell 
it in the open market, and that they generally pay little 
regard to the information that they receive along with the 
service. The other problem, of course, is the impact on 
health of the distribution of powdered milk (which comes in 
a package deal along with other food items) to children who 
live in villages that lack potable water supplies. At this 
stage, it appears that as long as control and authority is 
not in the hands of Palestinians, and since there seems to 
be no interest on the part of the military government and 
CRS to solve the problem, powdered milk and food aid 
distribution will continue. other food aid distributors in 
the occupied Territories include Care and the military 
governments's social welfare department. 
(11)	 I attended one of these meetings that occurred between the 
organisers and the community early in 1981. The language 
barrier was clearly creating a situation that can be 
described as almost comic. The organisers knew and 
appreciated the importance of this point, but, given what I 
suspect was pressure from above, they decided to continue 
with the project, and to try to make the best out of a 
difficult situation. 
(12)	 An agency that was established in 1977 with the purpose of 
channelling funds to the Occupied Territories for 
steadfastness purposes. 
(13)	 This may be justified in view of the need for basic services 
in most rural communities in the Occupied Territories. 
(14)	 For further information, see Tamari, S., and Giacaman, R., 
Ope cit., Part I. 
(15)	 Such services include, for instance, family reunion permits, 
bridge passes to Jordan and other important services that 
are controlled by the military government. It is thought 
that the "'Abed connection" was instrumental in obtaining 
building permits for this village which occupies Miri 
(government) land, and which was prohibited from even 
repairing existing houses from 1967 till 1980. 
(16)	 Drip also benefited the landless farmers who had share­
cropping arrangements with absentee landlords. It is 
interesting to note that MCC provided financial and 
technical help to farmers so as to install drip technology 
into both Zbeidat and absentee landlord property. Thus 
benefits from drip technology were also incurred by the big 
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landlords. 
(17)	 The women's committees are four community and women's 
development groups that have revolutionised the activities 
of women's organisations in the Occupied Territories. Their 
remarkable creativity and efforts are slowly breaking new 
barriers in steadfastness activities in the area. For 
further information on the sUbject, see: Giacaman, R., 
Women and Development in Occupied Palestine, Report to the 
united Nations' 7th Seminar on the Question of Palestine, 
Proceedings, Dakkar, Senegal, 1982. 
(18)	 See, for instance: Dore, R. and Mars, Z. (eds.), Community 
Development, London: UNESCO/Croom Helm, 1981. 
(19)	 This information and all other information pertaining to the 
new military order and its consequences, including the 
English translation of the text, was obtained from Mr. 
Ibrahim Matar, MCC, Jerusalem. 
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